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Written constitutions and the administrative state:
on the constitutional character of administrative
law
Tom Ginsburg

Administrative law is the poor relation of public law; the hard-working, unglamorous
cousin laboring in the shadow of constitutional law. Constitutional law, it is generally
believed, resolves the great issues of state and society, while administrative law, in its best
moments, merely refines those principles for dealing with the administrative state. Law
students flock to constitutional law classes, of which most law schools have three or four
in the curriculum. The same students enroll in administrative law with a sense of obligation, as if the subject is a chore one has to manage.
The two fields are, of course, intimately related, and share an overarching purpose of
managing the relationship between state and citizen, with an emphasis on protection of
the latter in democratic states. On the other hand, the fields reflect different legal sources
and modalities. In some countries, they are adjudicated by entirely different courts.
While constitutional law is becoming ever more comparative, with judges regularly citing
each other’s opinions, administrative law remains bound to the nation state.
This chapter makes three arguments. First, it argues that the conceptual division
between administrative and constitutional law is quite porous, and that along many
dimensions, administrative law can be considered more constitutional in character
than constitutions. Second, it shows that written constitutions do relatively little to
legally constrain the administrative state. Rather, their role is to establish the broader
structural apparatus of governance and accountability, in which the bureaucracy is
the great unspoken. This leaves administrative law as a relatively free-standing field
characterized by great flexibility and endurance, features that are usually thought to
be more embodied in constitutions. Third, the chapter concludes that the exercise of
comparison helps to expose the limits of written constitutions, and to call for greater
attention to comparative administrative law as a feature of the unwritten constitution
of nation states.
1. On the constitutional character of administrative law
The conventional understanding is that the fields of constitutional and administrative
law share similar purposes of protection of rights, control of agency costs, and limitation
of government. The primary difference, in this view, concerns their place in the hierarchy
of public law: constitutional law regulates the highest norms of the state, while administrative law governs sub-legislative action, somewhat lower in the hierarchy of sources,
and hence in importance.
In contrast, I argue that along several dimensions, administrative law should be understood as more ‘constitutional’ than constitutional law. Consider the widely ascribed
functions attributed to constitutions (Breslin 2009). Many would place the function of
117
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constitutionalism itself or limitation of government by law, at the fore. With regard to
this limiting function, it is quite obvious that administrative law overlaps a good deal
with constitutional law, and has a wider scope in the sense that it touches far more
behavior. The average citizen is not a dissident who is concerned with the state limiting her political speech; nor is the average citizen a criminal concerned with criminal
procedure provisions in constitutions. Rather the average citizen encounters the state
in myriad petty interactions, involving drivers’ licenses, small business permits, social
security payments, and taxes. It is here that the rubber meets the road for constitutionalism, where predictability and curbs on arbitrariness are least likely to be noticed but
most likely to affect a large number of citizens. So it seems clear that administrative law
is constitutionalist in orientation and arguably more important to more people than the
grand issues of constitutional law.
Constitutionalism, though, is hardly the only function of constitutions. Indeed, constitutions exist in a wide variety of states that cannot be called limited in any real sense.
Nor are these ‘paper’ constitutions to be characterized as useless (Brown 2008). Even
in dictatorships, constitutions can provide accurate maps of what institutions matter.
Autocrats and oligarchies need to coordinate their own internal expectations about
the mechanisms of rule, and constitutions can play an important role in aligning such
expectations. In some cases, constitutional rules provide useful frameworks for resolving intra-elite disputes (Barros 2002). This function of constitutions is not limitation but
definition, constituting government by empowering it and establishing organizations to
carry out its tasks. The administrative law analogue to this function of setting up government agencies is captured by organic statutes. These are rarely the subject of legal dispute
except in terms of scope of delegation by the legislature.1
Another set of functions widely ascribed to constitutions are symbolic or expressive.
In some polities, constitutions reflect and sometimes even create a shared consciousness, and so overcome regional and ethnic divisions. In South Africa, for example, the
1996 Constitution became a symbol of participation and reconciliation, and retains
popularity notwithstanding major social problems and disaffection from government.
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 is widely attributed to have had great symbolic value
even though it took many decades before it was effectively enforced. The symbolic or
expressive function of constitutions emphasizes the particularity of constitution-making.
It is We the People that come together, and so the constitution embodies our nation in a
distinct and local way different from other polities.
So constitutions limit government, establish institutions, and serve as important
symbols for the polity. The mode by which constitutions carry out these functions is
familiar. Constitutions work through entrenchment, providing an enduring set of foundational rules, structuring and facilitating normal politics in a particularistic way that
reflects local values.
Administrative law accomplishes some but not all of these functions, and does so in
a less grand manner. Very little writing on administrative law discusses the symbolic
dimensions of articulation of state-society relations. Organic statutes for particular
agencies are not always entrenched, and the major instruments governing administrative

1

For a broader perspective on coordination in administrative law, see Ahdieh (forthcoming).
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procedure and adjudication are typically statutory in character, in principle amendable
as conditions change.
My first argument is that administrative law is often a better reflection of the local and
that it is administrative law which provides for more endurance in many polities. Only at
a symbolic level, then, can constitutions claim distinct functions that administrative law
does not accomplish: only constitutions can be said to constitute the nation or bind the
people together through common understandings. But this symbolism is in turn based on
an illusion and a misunderstanding of the crucial constitutional characteristics of endurance and localism. Constitutions serve as important symbols because people believe they
do things that they do not. Administrative law systems, in turn, are more localized and
more enduring, and hence worthy of greater attention in trying to understand the effective legal regulation of government.
1.1. Localism: constitutions converge more than do administrative law systems
The classic image of constitution-making is of a discrete group of citizens coming
together to empower a government. This social contract imagery is temporally and
geographically bounded. We the People produce the constitution as a distinctive reflection of our local values. But this imagery is wrong on several scores. First, international
actors increasingly have a stake in constitution-making and take substantive positions in
the drafting process (Lollini and Palermo 2009). Second, and somewhat related, constitutions have converged in substance over time. A substantial body of research has demonstrated that provisions of national constitutions have come to reflect a kind of script
of national modernism in which the local is subordinate to global norms (Go 2003, Boli
1987, Boli-Bennett and Meyer1978, 1980). The basic forms of governance, too, seem to
divide into fairly predictable variants.
Why might this be the case? Because constitutions are the highest legal norms of a
state, they have expressive elements, and these are often addressed outside the nation
state at an international community. Constitutions are signals of modernity and sovereignty, designed not only to empower a government but to secure recognition of that
act on the international plane. The result is that there has been a significant amount of
constitutional convergence.
Consider menus of human rights, for example. Constitutional collections of rights
have tended to converge over time, particularly following the passage of the major
international human rights instruments (Elkins and Ginsburg 2009). The international
covenants and regional charters of rights serve as menus for constitution-makers, and
so it is hardly surprising that constitutions have become more similar to each other over
time. There are many possible explanations for this phenomenon. Convergence may in
part result from mimicry, in which countries need to signal their modernity and so adopt
institutions most reflective of the international. It might alternatively reflect collective
learning, as countries learn from each other and from international institutions about
the quality of different institutional configurations. Whatever the explanation, the result
is that constitutions can no longer be viewed, if they ever could, as exclusively local
affairs.
Contrast the situation in administrative law. Surveying global developments, the
overarching impression must be one of continued stickiness of national institutional
configurations. Taking four major jurisdictions, France, Germany, the US and the
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UK, it is clear that great institutional and ideational divergence remains. France retains
its tradition of oversight by expert administrators in the Conseil d’Etat, with the droit
administratif considered a separate and autonomous body of law (Brown and Bell 1998).
Germany too retains specialized administrative courts, but unlike the French tradition
centers its practice around an administrative procedure code that embodies the principles to be overseen by judges. In scope, too, the traditions differ in that tort liability and
government contract law, however, are seen to be outside the realm of German administrative law.2 While it can also include general policy directions, German administrative
law focuses more on individual rights-type issues than on public participation in rulemaking, which is where much of the action is in American administrative law.
In the UK, administrative law has long labored under Dicey’s suspicion of the very
concept (Lindseth 2005, Williams 1994). Dicey saw virtue in control by the common law
courts rather than a distinctive set of institutions, but as the modern state expanded,
it became clear that the sheer volume of appeals would overwhelm the traditionally
small English judiciary. The result was the creation of independent ‘tribunals’, distinct
from the common law courts, to hear appeals from initial decisions by administrators.
These are specific and specialized, tied to individual bureaucracies such as the Health
Service, Immigration, and Social Welfare bureaucracies, although recent reforms under
the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 promise to consolidate the structure
(Carnworth 2009). The tribunals have a statutory obligation to deliver independent
justice, and they rely on notions of ‘natural justice’ in developing constraints on administrative discretion and procedure. In the United States, in contrast, the Administrative
Procedures Act focuses a good deal of its energy on the practice of rule-making, and it is
here that the largest battles in the administrative state are conducted.
To be sure, there has been some convergence across jurisdictions in the norms of
administrative law. Most major systems involve questions of balancing, proportionality
and procedural transparency. One can generalize that in all four jurisdictions one can
describe administrative law as largely judge-made (counting the Conseil d’Etat as a judicial organ), in which courts apply a set of open-ended standards to myriad factual situations. But each system remains its own distinctive animal. Furthermore, there is little
of the trans-national judicial borrowing that has drawn such attention in comparative
constitutional interpretation.
One of the reasons that administrative law may have converged less than constitutional law is the lack of agreement over the scope of the field. Constitutions, for nearly
all modern states today, are defined in relation to (even if not exclusively bounded
by) authoritative texts called constitutions. There is less conceptual agreement on the
boundaries of administrative law: while all the administrative law schemes rely heavily
on a notion of internal and external boundaries of the system, the precise lines differ (for
example, with regard to where government contracts fall), as does the precise mix of tort
liability, judicial remedies and other mechanisms of control. Administrative procedure
calibrates the rigidity of the boundaries and reflects different conceptions of public and
private. For example, continental and Japanese systems draw on a strong conceptual
2
The scope of government liability is in fact less extensive in Germany than in France.
In Germany, it is covered by principles of negligence, whereas in France, no-fault liability for
regulations is allowed (Singh 2001:257).
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distinction between public and private law. In the United States, the public-private distinction is less rigid, with private law regularly utilized to accomplish regulatory ends,
and hence the proper boundaries of administrative law as a field may be somewhat
more open. The relative mix of natural law principles and positivistic focus on proper
delegations also varies across systems.
Institutional structures differ, too, with distinctive administrative courts in France and
Germany, while the Anglo-American systems rely on the generalized notion of the rule
of law to subject the state to ordinary courts, on an equal footing as citizens. The systems
also exhibit divergence on the extent to which administrative law has been developed
primarily through case-by-case judicial decision-making or through legislative exercises
in codification; though again it must be said that judicial development has played a
prominent role nearly everywhere.
In short, there may be less convergence in administrative law than in constitutional
law, where judges regularly look to decisions of other courts, and constitutional drafters
draw on foreign models. Forces against convergence in administrative law include institutional inertia, entrenched political interests, path dependencies, and cultural preferences that render some solutions unattractive in particular polities. Many scholars have
argued that public law should see less convergence than corporate or private law because
it reflects values rather than interests, and hence is less likely to be shaped by short-term
economic factors. Professor Schwarze (2004, see also Lindseth 2005), for example, catalogues the traditional arguments that administrative law expresses ‘national particularities’ and therefore is relatively impermeable to change.
Administrative law concerns the control of regulatory institutions, and regulatory
institutions are difficult to establish. Once established, they are even harder to get rid
of. An alternative to eliminating agencies is to seek to exercise greater control over
them, and administrative law becomes a natural solution. It is perhaps no surprise
that all industrialized countries have developed extensive bodies of administrative
law in the past century. But administrative procedures, like primary regulatory rules,
also have the quality of establishing their own communities around them. The muchcriticized Administrative Procedures Act in the United States has never been changed
despite numerous proposals to that effect. Nor is it likely that specialized administrative courts can be disbanded without a major constitutional revolution. While we have
seen the establishment of new administrative courts and specialized benches (that is,
in Korea, with similar proposals currently circulating in Japan), it is rare to see an
administrative court merged into the ordinary court system. Indeed, in the French
case, the Conseil Constitutionnel has even held that one has the right to recourse to
an administrative judge. In short, then, inertia can make switching costs of change
prohibitive and the disbanding of institutions difficult. Thus we see substantial divergence in the structures of administrative law. A corollary of this continued divergence
is that administrative law systems reflect localism more than constitutional law, which
is now embedded in open and vigorous transnational dialogues about particular issues
(Jackson 2009).
1.2. Endurance: administrative law institutions endure, while constitutions do not
Constitutions are defined by entrenchment, and their authors and audiences presuppose
that they provide a set of relatively enduring norms. To be sure, constitutions are subject
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to amendment procedures, but these are assumed to be exercised relatively infrequently
and only for issues of sufficient importance. Constitutions are higher law and hence to be
protected against frequent change. Indeed, the very notion of constitutionalism presupposes a certain level of endurance.
Yet written constitutions do not endure in most countries (Elkins et al. 2009). Even
among industrial democracies, France (with its 11 constitutions since 1791) is more
typical than the United States, with its venerable 220-year old document. In Western
Europe, the region of the world where constitutions are most enduring, the average
document will last only about 30 years, and the figure for countries in other parts of the
world is much lower. Constitutional change is sometimes associated with drastic changes
in the character of the regime, in the design of political institutions, and the mechanisms
of ensuring political accountability.
Contrast administrative law institutions. The venerable Conseil d’Etat has survived
episodic swings between monarchy and republic, presidentialism and parliamentarism,
dictatorship and democracy. It has maintained a relatively autonomous system of monitoring bureaucratic behavior and ensuring legality in administration. (Indeed, one might
argue that the formal constitution matters less in the French tradition precisely because
the autonomous state endures.) Nor is France alone. The Swedish ombudsman institution dates to 1809 and has survived major transformations of the political structure. And
distinct administrative courts in the German tradition have been enduring.3 The Soviet
procuracy survived myriad constitutional changes, and indeed has retained its role of
general supervision in some post-soviet constitutions notwithstanding complete regime
transformation. When one moves beyond Western Europe, constitutions become more
ephemeral but administrative law structures may be relatively stable. Thailand, with its
18 constitutions since 1932, may be an extreme case, but bureaucratic autonomy centered around a Council of State has been an enduring feature.4 Similarly, the institution
of amparo in Latin America has enjoyed widespread and continuous usage, notwithstanding constitutional instability (Brewer-Carias 2008).
Institutional structures are distinct from legal norms. The norms of administrative law
do change with developments in technology, with ideas about rights, and with the emergence of communities of accountability, all of which may reflect changes embodied in
constitutional texts. Nevertheless, this discussion suggests that administrative law structures are relatively enduring, in many cases more so than constitutional regimes. Indeed,
endurance at the administrative level may ameliorate the negative effects of instability
at the constitutional level: whatever the machinations over political institutions, citizens
may enjoy relative predictability in relations with the state bureaucracy.

3
Japan did change its structure of administrative law with the 1946 Constitution, shifting
away from the German tradition of distinct administrative courts toward the American model of
unified jurisdiction. Some attribute Japanese judges’ reluctance to challenge administrative action
to the institutional residue associated with this shift – ordinary judges do not have confidence in
their ability to second guess administration (Haley 1991).
4
The 1997 Constitution corresponded with the introduction of an administrative court that
did have important ramifications for Thai administrative law. But this was the exception that
proved the rule (Leyland 2008).
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1.3. Symbolism: the inferiority of administrative law systems
To summarize the argument so far, administrative law is enduring and it retains a local
quality even in an era of globalization. Constitutional law, in contrast, is increasingly
transnational as well as, too frequently, transitional. One might then view administrative
law regimes as better embodying constitutional values than constitutions themselves.
One distinct feature of national constitutions, however, is their ability to bind the polity
together through symbolic expression. Not all constitutions effectively play this role, but
it is an aspiration of many. In contrast, administrative law is rarely ascribed symbolic
resonance. Few are willing to die for the principle that expert regulators ought to hold a
public hearing before deciding how many parts per million of a pollutant can be released
by a smokestack, or that an individual has a right to pre-deprivation hearing regarding
loss of social security eligibility. Here, then, we expose what is truly distinctive about
constitutional law, and the one sense in which constitutions can be said to be more constitutional than administrative law regimes. Constitutions express ideas about the polity,
and do so largely on an international stage. We the People are signifying that we are not
those other people, and so adopt statements of our distinct national character embodied
in constitutional institutions. And because the statements are directed, to some degree,
outside the state, they require a common language to be understood. Convergence in
constitutional vocabulary in some sense facilitates the distinct communicative quality of
written constitutions.
Perhaps it is too much to say that administrative law systems lack symbolic value.
Some scholars have talked about the communicative and legitimating virtues of administrative process. But one would be hard-pressed to argue that the degree of symbolic
importance attached to administrative law systems approaches that of constitutions.
Written constitutions embody moments of great struggle and high stakes, and hence
mark the great junctures of national history.
2. Written constitutions and the administrative state
This part of the chapter examines the constitutional treatment of administrative law. In
general, written constitutions tend to say relatively little about the administrative state,
though the establishment of a government structure is a core function of constitutions.
While the rules governing selection and activities of executives and parliaments are
described in great detail, the sub-political institutions of government are not consistently or thoroughly regulated. Written constitutions tend to focus on providing chains
of accountability and democratic legitimacy for the decisions of administrators, rather
than detailed rules regulating the administration. In other words, constitutions tend to
regulate administration structurally rather than legally.
A search of several hundred contemporary and constitutional texts reveals that only
a handful mention the bureaucracy at all, and often use bureaucracy as an epithet.5 In
terms of legal constraint on the state, general due process-type considerations may apply
particularly to administrative agencies.6 But provisions such as South Africa’s Article
5
For example, the Constitution of Vietnam (1992), Art. 112 (power of government to ‘fight
against bureaucracy’ in state administration). The sample is from the Comparative Constitutions
Project, www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org.
6
For example, the Constitution of Dominican Republic (1966), Art. 8.2.j (no sentence without
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33, constitutionalizing rights to ‘lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair’ administrative
action and a right to receive reasons for adverse actions, are truly exceptional.7 General
due process requirements, which are found more broadly (roughly 10% of national constitutions) are on their face frequently restricted to criminal proceedings, and hence may
not automatically facilitate judicial oversight of administration.
What one does see is that written constitutions reflect developments in the technology of governance. Thus, the creation of the independent regulatory agency is reflected
in constitutional texts: the US Constitution of 1789 of course does not mention any
independent agencies (it barely mentions ‘departments’), while the average constitution
drafted in the 1990s mentions more than three such bodies. And certain administrative
law institutions, like the ombudsman or human rights commissions, have become more
popular: roughly 20% of constitutions currently in force provide for an ombudsman, for
example. A smaller number, less than 10%, provide for a counter corruption commission. Historically, the regulatory body most relevant to checking the administrative state
is a council or court of audit, and these institutions are relatively frequently observed:
nearly 20% of all constitutional texts coded to date in our project (700 total) include
some agency designed to supervise accounts or audit.8
Another way in which constitutions may affect the administrative state is through the
establishment of a public service commission or other device to guarantee meritocratic
employment practices. In many societies, state jobs are highly desirable and so the temptation to utilize them as a form of patronage is great. A pre-commitment to meritocracy
is a constitutional function. As early as 1824, Brazil’s Constitution felt the need to say
that ‘all individuals are equal to occupy public offices; talent and virtues will determine
if a person can occupy a public office’.9 The Republic of China went so far as to establish
an entire branch of government, the Examination Yuan, just to administer state exams.
This body still functions on Taiwan today, and as a formal matter has equal status with
the Legislative and Executive branches of government. Its head is equivalent to the
Premier. The Republic of China also established a ‘Control’ branch of government, set
up to audit and fight corruption. Though these innovations have not been borrowed
elsewhere, their motivation is widespread.
Finally, constitutions engage with administrative law through the designation of
administrative court systems. These are found in countries from Mexico to Mongolia,
though they are not always constitutionalized (only about 2% of cases in our sample
include them). Even the French Constitution makes only incremental reference to the
Conseil d’Etat, which is not properly speaking a creature of the political constitution.
But the designation of an administrative jurisdiction can have very important consequences on the ground. In some transitioning democracies, it is the administrative courts
rather than the higher profile constitutional court that have actually served to constrain
the state. Two examples here are Indonesia (Bedner 2001) and Thailand (Leyland 2008).

procedure established by law); Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 38 (no person shall be tried on
any criminal charge save in due course of law).
7
See also Draft Constitution of Kenya (1999), Art 70.
8
For details, see www.constitutionmaking.org and www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org
or contact author.
9
Art. 179.14.
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In each case, a constitutional court created as part of a transition to democracy was set
up alongside a new or recently created administrative court. In each case, the constitutional court was called on to adjudicate high-profile political issues that led to a political backlash against the court. In contrast, the administrative law systems worked at a
lower level of government and served to provide, for the first time in many areas, genuine
legality in administration. This is an example of how a lower-profile administrative
court may have more impact in furthering constitutionalist values than a higher-profile
constitutional court.
In short, written constitutions are short on detail about legal control of administration. Administrative action is regulated through structural provisions on the design of
government and accountability chains, through the creation of specialized monitors
such as ombudsmen and administrative courts, and through provisions requiring meritbased selection of agents. To understand the functioning of administrative law in various
countries, written constitutions turn out not to be very helpful, notwithstanding the
constitutional character of many of the norms and purposes of administrative law.
3. Administrative law systems as an element of the uncodified constitution
In recent years, scholars have renewed their attention to the so-called unwritten constitution (Grey 1978, Ackerman 2007, Young 2008, Tribe 2008). It has, of course, long
been recognized that, in any constitutional system, the language of constitutional text
is modified and interpreted by political actors and courts. In the United States, judges
of the Supreme Court have filled in the details of the vague 18th century document to
make it suitable for modern life, notwithstanding the lack of explicit textual basis for
constitutional review. More broadly, extraconstitutional mechanisms of constitutional
change have in some sense involved or relied on unwritten constitutional conventions
(Ackerman 1993, Munro 1928, Tiedeman 1890).
Constitutional functions are also performed by written texts beyond the constitution itself. Some statutes have been considered to be ‘super-statutes’ that are practically
entrenched, even if not formally so (Eskridge and Ferejohn 2005). Although the writers
on super-statutes focus on particular regulatory instruments, such as the Sherman
Antitrust Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, procedural laws surely fit into the category in the sense of meeting criteria of de facto entrenchment and substantive reach.
Administrative procedures laws are meta-regulations, designed to govern the way in
which substantive regulations are generated and operate. It seems difficult to exclude
the US Administrative Procedures Act, for example, from the scope of the ‘constitution
outside the constitution’. Perhaps, then, the analysis here suggests the need to keep our
eyes wide in looking for legal instruments that embody constitutionalism.
The core critique of the uncodified constitution is, unsurprisingly, rooted in the lack of
a rule of recognition. Without a clear rule that helps to identify particular norms as constitutional or not-constitutional, the boundaries of the category become fuzzy. But the
discussion at the outset of this chapter seems potentially helpful for articulating constitutional boundary criteria. Constitutions, we have seen, focus on regulating interactions
between the state and the people, and are at least imagined to be relatively enduring. In
considering what norms outside the constitution might be considered uncodified constitutional norms, it seems clear that those rules that are relatively enduring, and purport
to regulate the relationship between the state and society, should be within the definition.
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What are the normative consequences of treating administrative law systems as essentially constitutional in character? First, such constitutional realism helps us to focus
on those areas where constitutionalist values are most frequently encountered, even if
not always the matters of the highest stakes. Routine matters like drivers’ licenses and
building permits make a difference to more people than the high principles of constitutional text, even if they do not always carry great symbolic weight. Second, this focus
on the micro-level interactions of citizen and state draws needed attention away from
the constitutional courts, heretofore considered central actors in upholding the rule of
law. Constitutional courts, by the very nature of their exclusive and high jurisdiction,
frequently become embroiled in high profile politics that can undermine rather than
enhance their ability to constrain the state. Administrative courts may in such circumstances be more important on a number of levels. Finally, such an approach helps to
highlight the importance of the discipline of comparative administrative law. While the
field is still nascent, the various contributions in this volume help to draw out the rich
array of possibilities for the discipline.
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